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Neuroanatomical mapping of production compilation

Neuroanatomical mapping of production compilation


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ACT-R and Spaun map their production rule system onto the the basal ganglia and thalamus. However, I haven't been able to find how ACT-R maps production rule compilation onto the basal ganglia or thalamus. Does a mapping exist in ACT-R or in other cognitive architectures?


Given that all production rules reside in the Basal Ganglia and Thamalus, although it is not explicitly stated, the only place the rule compilation could feasibly take place is in the Basal Ganglia and Thalamus.


Defining

Declarative knowledge is knowing “that” (e.g., that Washington D.C. is the capital of America), as opposed to procedural knowledge is knowing “how” (e.g., how to drive a car).

Declarative knowledge is further divided into:

  • Episodic knowledge: memory for “episodes” (i.e., the context of where, when, who with etc) usually measured by accuracy measures, has autobiographical reference.
  • Semantic knowledge: Memory for knowledge of the world, facts, meaning of words, etc. (e.g., knowing that the first month of the year is April (alphabetically) but January (chronologically).

Discussion

Language is the main vehicle humans use to communicate and transfer information. Groups of neurons arranged in networks support language functions. Any modification to this system (e.g., brain lesions, epilepsy seizure) may irreversibly impair language capacity, leading to unexpected and problematic consequences for the affected individual. For this reason, brain surgeries are increasingly planned in an awake setting, making it possible to monitor patients’ language function and spare brain tissue that is indispensable (De Witte & Mariën, 2013). There is a critical need for specific tools, based on linguistic, neuroscientific, and clinical knowledge about how the brain decodes and encodes linguistic information, that can facilitate precise mapping of these eloquent regions during neurosurgery.

To address this need, we developed the MULTIMAP test, a multilingual picture naming task including both objects and actions for mapping eloquent areas during awake brain surgery. Images included in the MULTIMAP test are colored drawings of objects and actions that have been standardized in seven different languages (Spanish, Basque, Catalan, Italian, French, English, German, Mandarin Chinese, and Arabic), controlling for name agreement, frequency, length, and substitution neighbors. This image database was designed to minimize linguistic distance between different groups of items, allowing direct comparisons between objects and actions within and across languages. This new set of standardized pictures will be an important and useful tool, enabling neurosurgeons to intraoperatively map language functions while taking into account the double dissociation between nouns and verbs reported in the literature, and thus increasing presurgical and surgical mapping sensitivity for the detection of active eloquent brain areas. In addition, these materials will improve language mapping in multilingual patients, facilitating the identification and preservation of areas that show interference in only one of their languages that would not be detected by a monolingual test. MULTIMAP thus offers two important improvements over other picture naming tasks reported in the literature: the inclusion of objects and actions, and multilingual norming data.

In spite of empirical evidence demonstrating neuroanatomical distinctions for nouns and verbs (Vigliocco et al., 2011) and native and second/third languages (Giussani et al., 2007), there is no available material that tackles both of these issues at the same time. In this regard, MULTIMAP constitutes the first tool designed to explore these factors in a structured way, in order to identify and preserve eloquent brain tissue, and to obtain better results in terms of patients’ health and overall quality of life. MULTIMAP includes two separate tests, one for objects and one for actions, to address the noun/verb issue both tests are controlled so that there are no significant differences for linguistic variables such as frequency, length, and orthographic neighbors. The need to map both objects and actions is motivated by evidence of a double dissociation, demonstrated at the behavioral, electrophysiological, and neuroanatomical levels (Vigliocco et al., 2011) and, as pointed out in the Introduction, also reported in direct cortical stimulation studies. From the 52 reviewed studies where a picture naming task had been used in the context of awake brain surgery, we found only 13 that included a verb task in addition to object naming. Although these tasks were varied in their requirements and the nature of the stimuli they employed, they all identified distinct territories, mainly in frontal and temporal brain areas where stimulation impaired verb and noun production separately (Corina et al., 2005 Crepaldi et al., 2011 Lubrano et al., 2014 Ojemann et al., 2002 Rofes et al., 2017). Moreover, our tasks include an extra level of complexity beyond the extraction of morphosyntactic information, as the production of target objects and actions has been embedded in simple sentences, such as “This is a house” for objects and “He/she sings” in the case of actions. This entails a higher level of complexity, since the generation of such sentences requires the projection of representations in which thematic roles are assigned to different elements in the sentence (i.e., Heagent sings), in addition to matching the target word to its real-world referent. Therefore, combining object and verb processing tasks at the sentence level ensures a more accurate and thorough mapping of language functions, helping to more accurately identify and preserve the neural linguistic substrate essential for a patient’s quality of life.

The second improvement offered by MULTIMAP is its multilingual nature. Neuroimaging studies in bilinguals suggest that there is a common cerebral organization across languages, but also describe activations specific to each of the languages (Kim, Relkin, Lee, & Hirsch, 1997 Marian, Spivey, & Hirsch, 2003 Rueckl et al., 2015). Direct electrostimulation studies have also revealed language-specific areas (Giussani et al., 2007).This study concluded that multilingual patients should be tested in all languages in which they are fluent during brain mapping procedures so as to avoid selective or preferential impairments. With this objective in mind, the images included in MULTIMAP were tested in seven languages taking into account the lexical and morphological features of each language. This resulted in seven separate sets of object and action pictures with at least 80% name agreement in their target language, accounting for relevant linguistic variables like frequency and word length. These sets can be combined in controlled bilingual sets, enabling researchers from different countries to use the same materials, and to compare results not only from monolingual samples but also in cross-linguistic research on multilingual patients. It will also play a role in the postoperative quality of life for multilingual patients, as these materials will facilitate the identification and preservation of areas where interference impairs only one of their languages (Giussani et al., 2007), areas that might not be detected by monolingual tests.


The Science of Consciousness Needs a Notion of Type

Scientists searching for NCCs are measuring particular instances of mind-brain correlations, but this is hardly the end-point of their inquiry. They aim to generalize their findings. They want to know not only the neural correlate of a particular phenomenal token, say, the sensation of a sour taste. To put forward an infinite disjunction of particular phenomenal-neural correlations does not sound an attractive research project! The hope is that by accumulating a sufficient number of particular NCCs, the scientists will be in a position to generalize the data in some meaningful way. They will proceed by typing the phenomenal states into basic kinds and will try to assign to them broadly typed neurophysiological processes, carefully isolated during the experiments. This process needs to be repeatable both intrasubjectively and intersubjectively hence it cannot stop at the level of individual tokens but must involve types. As Fink (2016, p. 3) put it, it is because science aims at generality that “we aim at types-NCCs.” This process can begin very crudely, but a rough and ready form of phenomenal and neural type-taxonomy is at least a prerequisite of any empirical science of consciousness. Even if the consciousness scientist sets herself relatively unambitious goals – say, she just wants to compile a list of some law-like bi-directional correlations between phenomenal and neural states – she will need to rely on some notion of phenomenal and neural type, for it will be types of states and processes that eventually have to appear in this list of systematic correlations. A general form of such bi-directional correlations will be, Whenever a phenomenal state of type A is present, a neural process of type B is present (and vice versa).

A solution to the vertical mind-body-relation problem, though, need not inevitably appeal to types. The so-called weak (or “token-token”) theory of identity postulates identity only at the level of individual tokens of mental and neural events. However, as the advocates of the weak theory of identity (such as Davidson, 1970/2012 Fodor, 1974) admit, the token-token theory of identity does not permit systematization into law-like psycho-physical generalizations: individual instances of mental and neural events cannot be regimented into correlated type-sets. 7 The stronger, type-type theory of identity identifies types of conscious mental states with types of brain states and thus allows for systematic psycho-physical type-generalizations. Various forms of this stronger identity theory have been offered over the years (Place, 1956, 1988 Feigl, 1958 Smart, 1959 Lewis, 1966 Armstrong, 1968 Bechtel and Mundale, 1999 Polger, 2011 Polger and Shapiro, 2016 see also Gozzano and Hill, 2012). Debates within the philosophy of mind are quite extensive as regards the facets of the identity theory, its pros and cons (see Polger, 2009, for an overview), but very little attention has been given to the pivotal question of what the neurophysiological and phenomenal kinds are. Most theorists participating in these debates use the notions of phenomenal and neurophysiological types only intuitively, without giving any explicit principles of individuation. The same can be said of the empirical scientists of consciousness.

This absence of a common understanding of what constitutes a type is striking, given the centrality of the notion of type within both philosophy and neuroscience. Is pain a type of phenomenal state and the pain of a bee sting, the pain of a papercut etc. its instances? Or is the pain of a bee sting the type, and each individual instance of bee sting pain its token? The literature does not give any (decisive) answers to these questions. Usually, within the philosophy of mind, one or two examples of a phenomenal type are offered (pain and color perception are the most often used), and the assumption is that the reader will somehow get the whole idea. The brain side of things is hardly less nebulous: how we are to understand the notion of type in the neurophysiological domain is usually left underspecified. We shall try to remedy this by providing a tentative categorization of both kinds of types.

Phenomenal Types

As Chalmers suggested, phenomenal types are to be typed by their phenomenal features alone (Chalmers, 1996, 359 n. 2). The typing of phenomenal types is thus straightforward, because kinds of subjective experience are clearly distinct: think of visual and auditory sensations and the vivid differences between them. The criteria for distinguishing phenomenal types are subjective, because these mental states are not publicly available. However, subjective judgments inevitably constitute the data of scientific practice (Jack and Shallice, 2001 Piccinini, 2001 Chaminade and Decety, 2002 Jack and Roepstorff, 2003 Price and Aydede, 2005 Overgaard, 2006 Block, 2008). This notion of type is what we have in mind when discussing the phenomenal types below.

We propose a hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. We begin with the phenomenal types. At the top of the hierarchy are the most general kinds of types of conscious experience. At the bottom in the nomenclature we put “minimal types.” Between the general and the minimal types are all the in-between kinds of types, which form the focus both of philosophers of mind and cognitive neuroscientists in their research.

The highest category within the hierarchy comprises the most general types of sensations and feelings: pain, visual perception, taste, auditory perception, depression, etc. Take pain as an example. The International Association for the Study of Pain (2018) defines pain as 𠇊n unpleasant sensory and emotional experience.” 8 The definition mirrors the intuition about what the most general kind of a phenomenal type should be like. In the case of pain it has to be something that hurts and is felt to be unpleasant. Defined in this general way, pain includes an extensive number of tokens of pain. These may be, for example, sharp pain, throbbing pain, stabbing pain caused by a needle, etc. as they all are tokens of pain. The most general phenomenal types are characterized by the highest variability among their tokens. The more we proceed down the hierarchy, the less variability is present among tokens within a type.

Before we turn to the in-between types, the minimal type should be characterized. A type is minimal when a subject cannot or can barely distinguish any phenomenal difference between at least two different subjective experiences. Types are minimal in this sense, regardless of whether there is a difference in the corresponding external stimuli or not. For example, if someone pricks me with a needle and later on with a knife and in each case I feel no difference in my phenomenal experience, the phenomenal type is of a minimal kind. The same applies when the two indistinguishable or nearly-indistinguishable experiences are caused by the same external stimulus. Minimal type is thus defined as having a minimal or no variability in the phenomenal character of its tokens.

The in-between categories of types include tokens of all perceptual modalities: seeing blue, hearing middle C, smelling a rose, tasting a Camembert, fear upon seeing a spider, etc. Each of these sub-categories can be further divided into finer-grained ones, and these, in turn, can be divided into even subtler ones and so on. Thus the feeling of pain may be divided into more specific types such as the feeling of sharp pain, the feeling of throbbing pain, the feeling of burning pain, the feeling of cramping pain, the feeling of shooting pain, etc. Analogically, each of these types may be further split into finer-grained types such as the feeling of sharp pain caused by a needle, the feeling of sharp pain caused by an insect, etc., which again may be divided into even finer categories (see Figure 4). Each of these types is constituted by the individual instances of painful feelings which fall under it.

FIGURE 4. Hierarchical classification of phenomenal types. The hierarchy shows the most general types (perception of pain, visual perception, perception of taste, etc.) and, proceeding down, the less general types. (The subdivisions are sketched only for selected types.) The lower the type in the hierarchy, the lesser the variation between its instances. Minimal types manifest very little or no variability among their tokens.

To repeat, phenomenal types are classified exclusively by their phenomenal appearance. For instance, coffee tasters do not need to have any knowledge of how the particular token of coffee they are tasting has been made they just taste it and describe it according to its phenomenal properties. Knowledge of the causes of the sensations does not enter into the classification of the kinds of types subsumed in Figure 4 under the type taste of coffee, or of any other of the phenomenological sub-types mentioned. Even if the sub-types are labeled using the vocabulary of the causes of sensations, such as in the case of kinds of pain, the reference to causes serves simply to verbally differentiate between various painful feelings.

Not only empirically oriented philosophers of mind but also those scientists conducting consciousness research should be clear about where in the hierarchy the phenomenal types they are investigating are located. For instance, pain, one of the most commonly mentioned phenomenal types, is at a different level of generality from smelling an orange (Keaton, 2015, p. 396), fudgefeel (Tye, 1995, p. 54) and seeing a face (Lumer et al., 1998). Clarity regarding the target level of the phenomenal type is important because the corresponding neural types have to be located at the same level of generality.

Neural Types

The theory of identity postulates a correspondence between phenomenal and neurophysiological types at each level of generality. It is not obvious, though, which kinds of neural types match the phenomenal ones. Phenomenal types are typed by their phenomenal properties, whereas neural types are sorted by means of entirely distinct sets of characteristics. Usually, the existence of some neural type of mechanism is suggested, such as the infamous firing of C-fibers, and although this particular example is empirically wrong, it indicates a general approach to fixing neural types. The idea is to isolate the activated mechanism in the brain directly responsible for particular type of a conscious phenomenal experience. This can be done by repeating the measurements of brain states correlating with the tokens of the given phenomenal type. This is what the NCC research aims to do: to uncover the neural types by means of finding the same (or similar) pattern of neural activation across many tokens of the same (or relevantly similar) phenomenal experience.

Putting it this way gives pride of place to the practices of contemporary cognitive neuroscience. It locates neural types at the level of activated brain structures and neural populations. Cognitive neuroscientists studying, for example, the neural correlates of visual experience know that they have to devote most attention to the neural processes arising in areas such as V1, V2, V3, V4, MT and in some other parts of the temporo-parietal cortex. The fact that these areas are preferred over many other cortical sites is rooted in knowledge acquired over decades of empirical inquiry. The research has aimed to isolate the circumscribed anatomical areas responsible for specific functions cf. Broca’s studies on aphatic patients (Sobel, 2001). We believe that respecting the practices of cognitive neuroscience is a pragmatically sensible approach, although we do not want to disqualify other possible approaches to neural typing. 9

The practices of cognitive neuroscience place NCCs and thus the neural types firmly in the cerebral cortex. For example, it is a well-founded supposition that all NCCs are located within temporo-parieto-occipital cortical areas. 10 Contributions from subcortical structures such as the brainstem, reticular formation, hypothalamus and thalamus are necessary to sustain conscious states. However, these contributions are routinely ignored in the NCC research and there are even more systematical reasons for disregarding them: clinical and experimental findings show cases of extensive activity in the cerebral cortex even when the subcortical neuromodulatory systems, such as the reticular activation system, are unplugged. For example, during REM sleep people dream consciously although the cerebral cortex is disconnected from subcortical structures (Koch et al., 2016, p. 310).

Does the restriction to the cortex imply that a precise localization within cortex structures is part and parcel of neural typing? That could well be doubted. On the one hand, the localization thesis is to a large extent respected in neurosciences. Neuroscientists do not expect that for every individual case of the occurrence of a phenomenal state, its neural correlate can be found everywhere in the brain. The current debate is mostly about the mechanisms involved in visual perception and the functional specialization of individual visual areas or their sub-parts. Researchers do not expect to find correlates of visual consciousness in the extrastriate cortex in one experiment, in the anterior cingulate cortex in the following experiment and in dlPFC in the next experiment. They expect a degree of systematicity in how the NCCs of various types of phenomenal states are localized. Without this presumption, much of cognitive neuroscience would simply fall apart.

On the other hand, phenomena such as neural plasticity suggest that the localization of neural types is not absolute. Some phenomenal types may be implemented by different parts of the brain. The neural type, then, is the neurophysiological process, the mechanism, whatever it may be, sufficient for having a conscious phenomenal state. Localizing the processes in the brain is heuristically important it helps us to differentiate brain areas due to their functional properties so that it is subsequently possible to concentrate on the neural pattern-properties themselves. However, isolating the neural mechanisms of consciousness is the project which constitutes the search for neural types. These mechanisms can, due to lesions, for instance, neuroplastically shift their locations somewhat, without ceasing to be the same neural types (Buonomano and Merzenich, 1998).

The way we conceive neural types is reminiscent of the contemporary mechanistic philosophy of neuroscience (see Craver and Kaplan, 2011). The mechanists hold that a mechanism produces the phenomenon of interest to the neuroscientists. However, we would prefer to put this in terms of the theory of identity because the philosophical mechanism, when causally interpreted, faces the issue of dualism (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs). Thus the phenomena of interest, i.e., states of phenomenal consciousness, are not causally produced by the mechanism they are this mechanism. Various phenomenal types are to be straightforwardly identified with various neural type-mechanisms.

Putting It Together

What is the relationship between the two type-taxonomies, phenomenal and neural? Should we type the neurophysiological processes according to phenomenal criteria, or vice versa? Should they be typed entirely independently? We doubt that the latter is an option. On the one hand, phenomenal and neurophysiological states are typed by sets of very different characteristics – by phenomenal properties on the mental side, by neuroscientifically salient properties on the brain side. This could lead one to believe that to prefer the independent classification of both domains is the way to produce the right types. On the other hand, producing both taxonomies in complete isolation from one another and hoping that one day they will match perfectly is a dubious project. Such a meeting of types could never happen. We need a bridging procedure that brings phenomenal and neural types together.

This bridging procedure includes systematic NCC measurement in various sensory modalities. Without it, neuroscientific typing will produce taxonomies that will take into account only neuroanatomical (such as cytoarchitectonic) properties, whereas mental typing will produce taxonomies that will in no obvious way correspond to these neuroanatomical maps. (Think of the early introspectionists and their maps of 𠇊toms of experience” – Revonsuo, 2010, pp. 52� Schwitzgebel, 2011, chapter 5). In short, typing mind and brain events and putting them together in a one-to-one correspondence relation is a jointly coordinated process based on the practice of searching for NCCs. We have already seen this in the previous subsection in which we defined neural types according to the neural mechanisms producing types of phenomenal states. These neural mechanisms cannot be uncovered in isolation from the phenomenal types. We agree with Viola (2017, pp. 164�): one should prefer such type-taxonomies as enable systematic mapping between the entities in both domains, the phenomenal and the physical. 11 This is not just pragmatically motivated advice. It is a conditio sine qua non of empirical consciousness research. 12

FIGURE 5. Simplified hierarchies of types. The diagrams show a one-to-one correspondence between simplified hierarchies of types. (A) displays the simplified hierarchy for phenomenal types of pain, (B) for phenomenal types of taste. On the right halves of both pictures, the corresponding neural types are assorted. Both the phenomenal and neural types are ordered according to the degree of generality: on the top the more general types are located, at the bottom the least general. An activated central nociceptive system (cNS in the diagram) is considered the neural correlate of pain activation of the primary gustatory cortex is considered the neural correlate of taste (Chen et al., 2011 Gazzaniga et al., 2014, p. 176 Peng et al., 2015).

The so-called Heuristic theory of identity (HIT) proposed by Bechtel and McCauley consists in the following claim: “Scientists often propose identities during the early stages of their inquiries. These hypothetical identities are not the conclusions of scientific research but the premises” (Bechtel and McCauley, 1999, p. 69). These postulated type-identities are one of the sources of empirical progress in neuroscience during research, they are further tested and refined. Now, some authors believe that postulating mind-brain identities is a methodologically dubious or perhaps even harmful step. For instance, Gamez (2014, p. 8) holds that “[w]hile it is possible that some version of identity theory or physicalism is correct, it would be controversial to base the scientific study of consciousness on this assumption, which would undermine our ability to gather data about the correlates of consciousness in a theory-neutral way.” In a similar vein, Paulewicz and Wierzchoń (2015, p. 238) claim that the empirical research of consciousness should proceed without introducing “unnecessary, untested and possibly confusing assumptions,” the identity theory presumably being one of them. In our view, these criticisms are misguided. Postulating mind-brain identities cannot affect empirical research into the neural correlates of consciousness in any negative way – indeed, quite the reverse. Besides the heuristic advantage of the prior assumptions of mind-brain identities that Bechtel and McCauley mention, adopting identity as a vertical mind-brain relation ensures that the coordination of phenomenal and neural processes is as tight as might be. As we will see in the next section, all other non-causal vertical notions construe a looser relation between phenomenal states and their neural substrate. This might please the anti-reductivists, but it puts in question the ontological status of the phenomenal and can potentially undermine the value of neuroscientific research for understanding consciousness: if the states of phenomenal consciousness are only loosely connected to their neural substrate, does scrutinizing the properties of this substrate really advance our understanding of how consciousness arises in nature?

The ultimate goal of the NCC research is to find the mechanism of consciousness itself (what Fink, 2016, calls general NCC). This search goes beyond the pairing of phenomenal and neural types. It simply is a search for the common neural mechanism of all states of consciousness, no matter how we type them (and their neurophysiological counterparts). This content non-specific neural activity, be it neural recurrence (Lamme, 2015), thalamocortical reentry loops into the dynamical core (Tononi and Edelman, 1998), microactivations of essential nodes distributed in the cortex (Zeki, 2003), or any other non-specific neural mechanism, is of such a nature that whenever it is activated, states of phenomenal consciousness are also present. 13 It seems to be clear, though, that we can only reach this end-point of inquiry by working first with correlated phenomenal and neural type-taxonomies, gradually isolating the common neural mechanisms that they all share.


Colour Plate One: Cartographic Production.

Section One Conceptualising Mapping.

1.1 Introductory Essay: Conceptualising Mapping (Rob Kitchin, Martin Dodge and Chris Perkins).

1.2 General Theory, from Semiology of Graphics (Jacques Bertin).

1.3 On Maps and Mapping, from The Nature of Maps: Essays Toward Understanding Maps and Mapping (Arthur H. Robinson and Barbara B. Petchenik).

1.4 The Science of Cartography and its Essential Processes (Joel L. Morrison).

1.5 Analytical Cartography (Waldo R. Tobler).

1.6 Cartographic Communication (Christopher Board).

1.7 Design on Signs / Myth and Meaning in Maps (Denis Wood and John Fels).

1.8 Deconstructing the Map (J.B. Harley).

1.9 Drawing Things Together (Bruno Latour).

1.10 Cartography Without 'Progress': Reinterpreting the Nature and Historical Development of Mapmaking (Matthew H. Edney).

1.11 Exploratory Cartographic Visualisation: Advancing the Agenda (Alan M. MacEachren and Menno-Jan Kraak).

1.12 The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention (James Corner).

1.13 Beyond the 'Binaries': A Methodological Intervention for Interrogating Maps as Representational Practices (Vincent J. Del Casino Jr. and Stephen P. Hanna).

1.14 Rethinking Maps (Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge).

Colour Plate Two: Mapping the Internet.

Section Two Technologies of Mapping.

2.1 Introductory Essay: Technologies of Mapping (Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin and Chris Perkins).

2.2 A Century of Cartographic Change, from Technological Transition in Cartography (Mark S. Monmonier).

2.3 Manufacturing Metaphors: Public Cartography, the Market, and Democracy (Patrick H. McHaffie).

2.4 Maps and Mapping Technologies of the Persian Gulf War (Keith C. Clarke).

2.5 Automation and Cartography (Waldo R. Tobler)

2.6 Cartographic Futures on a Digital Earth (Michael F. Goodchild).

2.7 Cartography and Geographic Information Systems (Phillip C. Muehrcke).

2.8 Remote Sensing of Urban/Suburban Infrastructure and Socio-Economic Attributes (John R. Jensen and Dave C. Cowen).

2.9 Emergence of Map Projections, from Flattening the Earth: Two Thousand Years of Map Projections (John P. Synder).

2.10 Mobile Mapping: An Emerging Technology for Spatial Data Acquisition (Rongxing Li).

2.11 Extending the Map Metaphor Using Web Delivered Multimedia (William Cartwright).

2.12 Imaging the World: The State of Online Mapping (Tom Geller).

Colour Plate Three: Pictorial Mapping.

Section Three Cartographic Aesthetics and Map Design.

3.1 Introductory Essay: Cartographic Aesthetics and Map Design (Chris Perkins, Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin).

3.2 Interplay of Elements, from Cartographic Relief Presentation (Eduard Imhof).

3.3 Cartography as a Visual Technique, from The Look of Maps (Arthur H. Robinson).

3.4 Generalisation in Statistical Mapping (George F. Jenks).

3.5 Strategies for the Visualisation of Geographic Time-Series Data (Mark Monmonier).

3.6 The Roles of Maps, from Some Truth with Maps: A Primer on Symbolization and Design (Alan M. MacEachren).

3.7 Area Cartograms: Their Use and Creation (Daniel Dorling).

3.8 ColorBrewer.org: An Online Tool for Selecting Colour Schemes for Maps (Mark Harrower and Cynthia A. Brewer).

3.9 Maps, Mapping, Modernity: Art and Cartography in the Twentieth Century (Denis Cosgrove).

3.10 Affective Geovisualisations (Stuart Aitken and James Craine).

3.11 Egocentric Design of Map-Based Mobile Services (Liqiu Meng).

3.12 The Geographic Beauty of a Photographic Archive (Jason Dykes and Jo Wood).

Colour Plate Four: Visualising Cartographic Colour Schemes and Mapping Spatial Information Space.

Section Four Cognition and Cultures of Mapping.

4.1 Introductory Essay: Cognition and Cultures of Mapping (Chris Perkins, Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge).

4.2 Map Makers are Human: Comments on the Subjective in Maps (John K. Wright).

4.3 Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behaviour: Process and Products (Roger M. Downs and David Stea).

4.4 Natural Mapping (James M. Blaut).

4.5 The Map as Biography: Thoughts on Ordnance Survey Map, Six-Inch Sheet Devonshire CIX, SE, Newton Abbot (J.B. Harley).

4.6 Reading Maps (Eileen Reeves).

4.7 Mapping Reeds and Reading Maps: The Politics of Representation in Lake Titicaca (Benjamin S. Orlove).

4.8 Refiguring Geography: Parish Maps of Common Ground (David Crouch and David Matless).

4.9 Understanding and Learning Maps (Robert Lloyd).

4.10 Citizens as Sensors: The World of Volunteered Geography (Michael F. Goodchild).

4.11 Usability Evaluation of Web Mapping Sites (Annu-Maaria Nivala, Stephen Brewster and L. Tiina Sarjakoski)

Colour Plate Five: Visualising the Efforts of Volunteer Cartographers.

Section Five Power and Politics of Mapping.

5.1 Introductory Essay: Power and Politics of Mapping (Rob Kitchin, Martin Dodge and Chris Perkins).

5.2 The Time and Space of the Enlightenment Project, from The Condition of Postmodernity (David Harvey).

5.3 Texts, Hermeneutics and Propaganda Maps (John Pickles).

5.4 Mapping: A New Technology of Space Geo-Body, from Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Thongchai Winichakul).

5.5 First Principles of a Literary Cartography, from Territorial Disputes: Maps and Mapping Strategies in Contemporary Canadian and Australian Fiction (Graham Huggan).

5.6 Whose Woods are These? Counter-Mapping Forest Territories in Kalimantan, Indonesia (Nancy Lee Peluso).

5.7 A Map that Roared and an Original Atlas: Canada, Cartography, and the Narration of Nation (Matthew Sparke).

5.8 Cartographic Rationality and the Politics of Geosurveillance and Security (Jeremy W. Crampton).

5.9 Affecting Geospatial Technologies: Toward a Feminist Politics of Emotion (Mei-Po Kwan).

5.10 Queering the Map: The Productive Tensions of Colliding Epistemologies (Michael Brown and Larry Knopp).

5.11 Mapping the Digital Empire: Google Earth and the Process of Postmodern Cartography (Jason Farman).

Colour Plate Six: Cartographies of Protest.


Neuroanatomical mapping of production compilation - Psychology

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Contents

Emotions are thought to be related to activity in brain areas that direct our attention, motivate our behavior, and determine the significance of what is going on around us. Pioneering work by Paul Broca (1878), [3] James Papez (1937), [4] and Paul D. MacLean (1952) [5] suggested that emotion is related to a group of structures in the center of the brain called the limbic system, which includes the hypothalamus, cingulate cortex, hippocampi, and other structures. Research has shown that limbic structures are directly related to emotion, but non-limbic structures have been found to be of greater emotional relevance. The following brain structures are currently thought to be involved in emotion: [6]

Main structures of the limbic system Edit

    – The amygdalae are two small, round structures located anterior to the hippocampi near the temporal poles. The amygdalae are involved in detecting and learning what parts of our surroundings are important and have emotional significance. They are critical for the production of emotion, and may be particularly so for negative emotions, especially fear. [7] Multiple studies have shown amygdala activation when perceiving a potential threat various circuits allow the amygdala to use related past memories to better judge the possible threat. [8] – The thalamus is involved in relaying sensory and motor signals to the cerebral cortex, [9] especially visual stimuli. The thalamus also plays an important role in regulating states of sleep and wakefulness. [10] – The hypothalamus is involved in producing a physical output associated with an emotion as well as in reward circuits [11] – The hippocampus is a structure of the medial temporal lobes that is mainly involved in memory. It works to form new memories and also connecting different senses such as visual input, smell or sound to memories. The hippocampus allows memories to be stored long term and also retrieves them when necessary. It is this retrieval that is used within the amygdala to help evaluate current affective stimulus. [12] – The fornix is the main output pathway from the hippocampus to the mammillary bodies. It has been identified as a main region in controlling spatial memory functions, episodic memory and executive functions. [13] – Mammillary bodies are important for recollective memory. [14] – The olfactory bulbs are the first cranial nerves, located on the ventral side of the frontal lobe. They are involved in olfaction, the perception of odors. [15] – The cingulate gyrus is located above the corpus callosum and is usually considered to be part of the limbic system. The different parts of the cingulate gyrus have different functions, and are involved with affect, visceromotor control, response selection, skeletomotor control, visuospatial processing, and in memory access. [16] A part of the cingulate gyrus is the anterior cingulate cortex, that is thought to play a central role in attention [17] and behaviorally demanding cognitive tasks. [18] It may be particularly important with regard to conscious, subjective emotional awareness. This region of the brain may also play an important role in the initiation of motivated behavior. [18] The subgenual cingulate is more active during both experimentally induced sadness and during depressive episodes. [19]

Other brain structures related to emotion Edit

    – Basal ganglia are groups of nuclei found on either side of the thalamus. Basal ganglia play an important role in motivation, [20] action selection and reward learning. [21] – Is a major structure involved in decision making and the influence by emotion on that decision. [22] – The term prefrontal cortex refers to the very front of the brain, behind the forehead and above the eyes. It appears to play a critical role in the regulation of emotion and behavior by anticipating the consequences of our actions. The prefrontal cortex may play an important role in delayed gratification by maintaining emotions over time and organizing behavior toward specific goals. [23]
  • Ventral striatum – The ventral striatum is a group of subcortical structures thought to play an important role in emotion and behavior. One part of the ventral striatum called the nucleus accumbens is thought to be involved in the experience pleasure. [24] Individuals with addictions experience increased activity in this area when they encounter the object of their addiction. – The insular cortex is thought to play a critical role in the bodily experience of emotion, as it is connected to other brain structures that regulate the body's autonomic functions (heart rate, breathing, digestion, etc.). The insula is implicated in empathy and awareness of emotion. [25] – Recently, there has been a considerable amount of work that describes the role of the cerebellum in emotion as well as cognition, and a "Cerebellar Cognitive Affective Syndrome" has been described. [26] Both neuroimaging studies as well as studies following pathological lesions in the cerebellum (such as a stroke) demonstrate that the cerebellum has a significant role in emotional regulation. Lesion studies [27] have shown that cerebellar dysfunction can attenuate the experience of positive emotions. While these same studies do not show an attenuated response to frightening stimuli, the stimuli did not recruit structures that normally would be activated (such as the amygdala). Rather, alternative limbic structures were activated, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate gyrus, and the insula. This may indicate that evolutionary pressure resulted in the development of the cerebellum as a redundant fear-mediating circuit to enhance survival. It may also indicate a regulatory role for the cerebellum in the neural response to rewarding stimuli, such as money, [28] drugs of abuse, [29] and orgasm. [30]

Role of the right hemisphere in emotion Edit

The right hemisphere has been proposed over time as being directly involved in the processing of emotion. Scientific theory regarding the role of the right hemisphere has developed over time and resulted in several models of emotional functioning. C.K. Mills was one of the first researchers to propose a direct link between the right hemisphere and emotional processing, having observed decreased emotional processing in patients with lesions to the right hemisphere. [31] [32] Emotion was originally thought to be processed in the limbic system structures such as the hypothalamus and amygdala. [33] As of the late 1980s to early 1990s however, neocortical structures were shown to have an involvement in emotion. [34] These findings led to the development of the right hemisphere hypothesis and the valence hypothesis.

The right hemisphere hypothesis Edit

The right hemisphere hypothesis asserts that the right hemisphere of the neocortical structures is specialized for the expression and perception of emotion. [35] The Right hemisphere has been linked with mental strategies that are nonverbal, synthetic, integrative, holistic, and Gestalt which makes it ideal for processing emotion. [34] The right hemisphere is more in touch with subcortical systems of autonomic arousal and attention as demonstrated in patients that have increased spatial neglect when damage is associated to the right brain as opposed to the left brain. [36] Right hemisphere pathologies have also been linked with abnormal patterns of autonomic nervous system responses. [37] These findings would help signify the relationship of the subcortical brain regions to the right hemisphere as having a strong connection.

The valence hypothesis Edit

The valence hypothesis acknowledges the right hemisphere's role in emotion, but asserts that it is mainly focused on the processing of negative emotions whereas the left hemisphere processes positive emotions. The mode of processing of the two hemispheres has been the discussion of much debate. One version suggests the lack of a specific mode of processes, stating that the right hemisphere is solely negative emotion and the left brain is solely positive emotion. [38] A second version suggests that there is a complex mode of processing that occurs, specifically that there is a hemispheric specialization for the expressing and experiencing of emotion, with the right hemisphere predominating in the experiencing of both positive and negative emotion. [39] [40] More recently, the frontal lobe has been the focus of a large amount of research, stating that the frontal lobes of both hemispheres are involved in the emotional state, while the right posterior hemisphere, the parietal and temporal lobes, is involved in the processing of emotion. [41] Decreased right parietal lobe activity has been associated with depression [42] and increased right parietal lobe activity with anxiety arousal. [43] The increasing understanding of the role the different hemispheres play has led to increasingly complicated models, all based some way on the original valence model. [44]

Despite their interactions, the study of cognition has, until the late 1990s, excluded emotion and focused on non-emotional processes (e.g., memory, attention, perception, action, problem solving and mental imagery). [45] As a result, the study of the neural basis of non-emotional and emotional processes emerged as two separate fields: cognitive neuroscience and affective neuroscience. The distinction between non-emotional and emotional processes is now thought to be largely artificial, as the two types of processes often involve overlapping neural and mental mechanisms. [46] Thus, when cognition is taken at its broadest definition, affective neuroscience could also be called the cognitive neuroscience of emotion.

Emotion go/no-go Edit

The emotion go/no-go task has been frequently used to study behavioral inhibition, particularly emotional modulation of this inhibition. [47] A derivation of the original go/no-go paradigm, this task involves a combination of affective “go cues”, where the participant must make a motor response as quickly as possible, and affective “no-go cues,” where a response must be withheld. Because “go cues” are more common, the task is able to measure one's ability to inhibit a response under different emotional conditions. [48]

The task is common in tests of emotion regulation, and is often paired with neuroimaging measures to localize relevant brain function in both healthy individuals and those with affective disorders. [47] [49] [50] For example, go/no-go studies converge with other methodology to implicate areas of the prefrontal cortex during inhibition of emotionally valenced stimuli. [51]

Emotional Stroop Edit

The emotional Stroop task, an adaptation to the original Stroop, measures attentional bias to emotional stimuli. [52] [53] Participants must name the ink color of presented words while ignoring the words themselves. [54] In general, participants have more difficulty detaching attention from affectively valenced words, than neutral words. [55] [56] This interference from valenced words is measured by the response latency in naming the color of neutral words as compared with emotional words. [53]

This task has been often used to test selective attention to threatening and other negatively valenced stimuli, most often in relation to psychopathology. [57] Disorder specific attentional biases have been found for a variety of mental disorders. [57] [58] For example, participants with spider phobia show a bias to spider-related words but not other negatively valenced words. [59] Similar findings have been attributed to threat words related to other anxiety disorders. [57] However, other studies have questioned these findings. In fact, anxious participants in some studies show the Stroop interference effect for both negative and positive words, when the words are matched for emotionality. [60] [61] This means that the specificity effects for various disorders may be largely attributable to the semantic relation of the words to the concerns of the disorder, rather than simply the emotionality of the words. [57]

Ekman 60 faces task Edit

The Ekman faces task is used to measure emotion recognition of six basic emotions. [62] [63] Black and white photographs of 10 actors (6 male, 4 female) are presented, with each actor displaying each basic emotion. Participants are usually asked to respond quickly with the name of the displayed emotion. The task is a common tool to study deficits in emotion regulation in patients with dementia, Parkinson's, and other cognitively degenerative disorders. [64] However, the task has also been used to analyze recognition errors in disorders such as borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. [65] [66] [67]

Dot probe (emotion) Edit

The emotional dot-probe paradigm is a task used to assess selective visual attention to and failure to detach attention from affective stimuli. [68] [69] The paradigm begins with a fixation cross at the center of a screen. An emotional stimulus and a neutral stimulus appear side by side, after which a dot appears behind either the neutral stimulus (incongruent condition) or the affective stimulus (congruent condition). Participants are asked to indicate when they see this dot, and response latency is measured. Dots that appear on the same side of the screen as the image the participant was looking at will be identified more quickly. Thus, it is possible to discern which object the participant was attending to by subtracting the reaction time to respond to congruent versus incongruent trials. [68]

The best documented research with the dot probe paradigm involves attention to threat related stimuli, such as fearful faces, in individuals with anxiety disorders. Anxious individuals tend to respond more quickly to congruent trials, which may indicate vigilance to threat and/or failure to detach attention from threatening stimuli. [68] [70] A specificity effect of attention has also been noted, with individuals attending selectively to threats related to their particular disorder. For example, those with social phobia selectively attend to social threats but not physical threats. [71] However, this specificity may be even more nuanced. Participants with obsessive-compulsive disorder symptoms initially show attentional bias to compulsive threat, but this bias is attenuated in later trials due to habituation to the threat stimuli. [72]

Fear potentiated startle Edit

Fear-potentiated startle (FPS) has been utilized as a psychophysiological index of fear reaction in both animals and humans. [73] FPS is most often assessed through the magnitude of the eyeblink startle reflex, which can be measured by electromyography. [74] This eyeblink reflex is an automatic defensive reaction to an abrupt elicitor, making it an objective indicator of fear. [75] Typical FPS paradigms involve bursts of noise or abrupt flashes of light transmitted while an individual attends to a set of stimuli. [75] Startle reflexes have been shown to be modulated by emotion. For example, healthy participants tend to show enhanced startle responses while viewing negatively valenced images and attenuated startle while viewing positively valenced images, as compared with neutral images. [76] [77]

The startle response to a particular stimulus is greater under conditions of threat. [78] A common example given to indicate this phenomenon is that one's startle response to a flash of light will be greater when walking in a dangerous neighborhood at night than it would under safer conditions. In laboratory studies, the threat of receiving shock is enough to potentiate startle, even without any actual shock. [79]

Fear potentiated startle paradigms are often used to study fear learning and extinction in individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder and other anxiety disorders. [80] [81] [82] In fear conditioning studies, an initially neutral stimulus is repeatedly paired with an aversive one, borrowing from classical conditioning. [83] FPS studies have demonstrated that PTSD patients have enhanced startle responses during both danger cues and neutral/safety cues as compared with healthy participants. [83] [84]

There are many ways affect plays a role during learning. Recently, affective neuroscience has done much to discover this role. Deep, emotional attachment to a subject area allows a deeper understanding of the material and therefore, learning occurs and lasts. [85] When reading, the emotions one is feeling in comparison to the emotions being portrayed in the content affects ones comprehension. Someone who is feeling sad will understand a sad passage better than someone feeling happy. [86] Therefore, a student's emotion plays a big role during the learning process.

Emotion can also be embodied or perceived from words read on a page or a person's facial expression. Neuroimaging studies using fMRI have demonstrated that the same area of the brain being activated when one is feeling disgust is also activated when one observes another person feeling disgust. [87] In a traditional learning environment, the teacher's facial expression can play a critical role in students' language acquisition. Showing a fearful facial expression when reading passages that contain fearful tones facilitates students learning of the meaning of certain vocabulary words and comprehension of the passage. [88]

A meta-analysis is a statistical approach to synthesizing results across multiple studies. Several meta-analyses examining the brain basis of emotion have been conducted. In each meta-analysis, studies were included that investigate healthy, unmedicated adults and that used subtraction analysis to examine the areas of the brain that were more active during emotional processing than during a neutral control condition. The meta-analyses to date predominantly focus on two theoretical approaches, locationist approaches and psychological construction approaches.

It is being debated regarding the existence of the neurobiological basis of emotion. [2] The existence of so-called 'basic emotions' and their defining attributes represents a long lasting and yet unsettled issue in psychology. [2] The available research suggests that the neurobiological existence of basic emotions is still tenable and heuristically seminal, pending some reformulation. [2]

Locationist approaches Edit

These approaches to emotion hypothesize that several emotion categories (including happiness, sadness, fear, anger, and disgust) are biologically basic. [89] [90] In this view, emotions are inherited biologically based modules that cannot be broken down into more basic psychological components. [89] [90] [91] Models following a locationist approach to emotion hypothesize that all mental states belonging to a single emotional category can be consistently and specifically localized to either a distinct brain region or a defined networks of brain regions. [90] [92] Each basic emotion category also shares other universal characteristics: distinct facial behavior, physiology, subjective experience and accompanying thoughts and memories. [89]

Psychological constructionist approaches Edit

This approach to emotion hypothesizes that emotions like happiness, sadness, fear, anger and disgust (and many others) are constructed mental states that occur when many different systems in the brain work together. [93] In this view, networks of brain regions underlie psychological operations (e.g., language, attention, etc.) that interact to produce many different kinds of emotion, perception, and cognition. [94] One psychological operation critical for emotion is the network of brain regions that underlie valence (feeling pleasant/unpleasant) and arousal (feeling activated and energized). [93] Emotions emerge when neural systems underlying different psychological operations interact (not just those involved in valence and arousal), producing distributed patterns of activation across the brain. Because emotions emerge from more basic components, there is heterogeneity within each emotion category for example, a person can experience many different kinds of fear, which feel differently, and which correspond to different neural patterns in the brain. Thus, this view presents a different approach to understanding the neural bases of emotion than locationist approaches. [ citation needed ]

Phan et al. 2002 Edit

In the first neuroimaging meta-analysis of emotion, Phan et al. (2002) analyzed the results of 55 studies published in peer reviewed journal articles between January 1990 and December 2000 to determine if the emotions of fear, sadness, disgust, anger, and happiness were consistently associated with activity in specific brain regions. All studies used fMRI or PET techniques to investigate higher-order mental processing of emotion (studies of low-order sensory or motor processes were excluded). The authors’ analysis approach was to tabulate the number of studies that reported activation in specific brain regions during tasks inducing fear, sadness, disgust, anger, and happiness. For each brain region, statistical chi-squared analysis was conducted to determine if the proportion of studies reporting activation during one emotion was significantly higher than the proportion of studies reporting activation during the other emotions. Two regions showed this statistically significant pattern across studies. In the amygdala, 66% of studies inducing fear reported activity in this region, as compared to

20% of studies inducing happiness,

15% of studies inducing sadness (with no reported activations for anger or disgust). In the subcallosal cingulate, 46% of studies inducing sadness reported activity in this region, as compared to

20% inducing happiness and

20% inducing anger. This pattern of clear discriminability between emotion categories was in fact rare, with a number of other patterns occurring in limbic regions (including amydala, hippocampus, hypothalamus, and orbitofrontal cortex), paralimbic regions (including subcallosal cingulate, medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, insula, and temporal pole), and uni/heteromodal regions (including lateral prefrontal cortex, primary sensorimotor cortex, temporal cortex, cerebellum, and brainstem). Brain regions implicated across discrete emotion included the basal ganglia (

60% of studies inducing happiness and

60% of studies inducing disgust reported activity in this region) and medial prefrontal cortex (happiness

Murphy et al. 2003 Edit

Murphy, et al. 2003 analyzed 106 peer reviewed journals published between January 1994 and December 2001 to examine the evidence for regional specialization of discrete emotions (fear, disgust, anger, happiness and sadness) across a larger set of studies that Phan et al. Studies included in the meta-analysis measured activity in the whole brain and regions of interest (activity in individual regions of particular interest to the study). 3-D Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS3) statistics were used to compare rough spatial distributions of 3-D activation patterns to determine if statistically significant activations (consistently activated across studies) were specific to particular brain regions for all emotional categories. This pattern of consistently activated, regionally specific activations was identified in four brain regions: amygdala with fear, insula with disgust, globus pallidus with disgust, and lateral orbitofrontal cortex with anger. The amygdala was consistently activated in

40% of studies inducing fear, as compared to less than 20% studies inducing happiness, sadness, or anger. The insula was consistently activated in

70% of studies inducing disgust, as compared to sadness (

10%). Similar to the insula, the globus pallidus was consistently activated in

70% of studies inducing disgust, as compared to less than 25% of studies inducing sadness, fear, anger or happiness. The lateral orbitofrontal cortex was consistently activated in over 80% of studies inducing anger, as compared to fear (

20%), happiness (< 20%) and disgust (< 20%). Other regions showed different patterns of activation across categories. For example, both the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex showed consistent activity across emotions (happiness

Barrett et al. 2006 Edit

Barrett, et al. 2006 examined 161 studies published between 1990 and 2001, subsets of which were analyzed in previous meta-analyses (Phan, et al. 2002 and Murphy et al. 2003). In this review, the authors examined the locationist hypothesis by comparing the consistency and specificity of prior meta-analytic findings specific to each hypothesized basic emotion (fear, anger, sadness, disgust, and happiness). Consistent neural patterns were defined by brain regions showing increased activity for a specific emotion (relative to a neutral control condition), regardless of the method of induction used (for example, visual vs. auditory cue). Specific neural patterns were defined as architecturally separate circuits for one emotion vs. the other emotions (for example, the fear circuit must be discriminable from the anger circuit, although both circuits may include common brain regions). In general, the results supported consistency among the findings of Phan et al. and Murphy et al., but not specificity. Consistency was determined through the comparison of chi-squared analyses that revealed whether the proportion of studies reporting activation during one emotion was significantly higher than the proportion of studies reporting activation during the other emotions. Specificity was determined through the comparison of emotion-category brain-localizations by contrasting activations in key regions that were specific to particular emotions. Increased amygdala activation during fear was the most consistently reported across induction methods (but not specific). Both meta-analyses also reported increased activations in regions of the anterior cingulate cortex during sadness, although this finding was less consistent (across induction methods) and was not specific to sadness. Both meta-analyses also found that disgust was associated with increased activity in the basal ganglia, but these findings were neither consistent nor specific. Neither consistent nor specific activity was observed across the meta-analyses for anger or for happiness. This meta-analysis additionally introduced the concept of the basic, irreducible elements of emotional life as dimensions such as approach and avoidance. This dimensional approach involved in psychological constructionist approaches is further examined in later meta-analyses of Kober et al. 2008 and Lindquist et al. 2012. [93]

Kober et al. 2008 Edit

Instead of investigating specific emotions, Kober, et al. 2008 reviewed 162 neuroimaging studies published between 1990–2005 to determine if groups of brain regions show consistent patterns of activation during emotional experience (that is, actively experiencing an emotion first-hand) and during emotion perception (that is, perceiving a given emotion as experienced by another). This meta-analysis used multilevel kernal density analysis (MKDA) to examine fMRI and PET studies, a technique that prevents single studies from dominating the results (particularly if they report multiple nearby peaks) and that enables studies with large sample sizes (those involving more participants) to exert more influence upon the results. MKDA was used to establish a neural reference space that includes the set of regions showing consistent increases across all studies (for further discussion of MDKA see Wager et al. 2007). [97] Next, this neural reference space was partitioned into functional groups of brain regions showing similar activation patterns across studies by first using multivariate techniques to determine co-activation patterns and then using data-reduction techniques to define the functional groupings (resulting in six groups). Consistent with a psychological construction approach to emotion, the authors discuss each functional group in terms more basic psychological operations. The first “Core Limbic” group included the left amygdala, hypothalamus, periaqueductal gray/thalamus regions, and amygdala/ventral striatum/ventral globus pallidus/thalamus regions, which the authors discuss as an integrative emotional center that plays a general role in evaluating affective significance. The second “Lateral Paralimbic” group included the ventral anterior insula/frontal operculum/right temporal pole/ posterior orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior insula/ posterior orbitofrontal cortex, the ventral anterior insula/ temporal cortex/ orbitofrontal cortex junction, the midinsula/ dorsal putamen, and the ventral striatum /mid insula/ left hippocampus, which the authors suggest plays a role in motivation, contributing to the general valuation of stimuli and particularly in reward. The third “Medial Prefrontal Cortex” group included the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, pregenual anterior cingulate cortex, and rostral dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, which the authors discuss as playing a role in both the generation and regulation of emotion. The fourth “Cognitive/ Motor Network” group included right frontal operculum, the right interior frontal gyrus, and the pre-supplementray motor area/ left interior frontal gyrus, regions that are not specific to emotion, but instead appear to play a more general role in information processing and cognitive control. The fifth “Occipital/ Visual Association” group included areas V8 and V4 of the primary visual cortex, the medial temporal lobe, and the lateral occipital cortex, and the sixth “Medial Posterior” group included posterior cingulate cortex and area V1 of the primary visual cortex. The authors suggest that these regions play a joint role in visual processing and attention to emotional stimuli. [98]


Behavioral and neuroanatomical investigation of Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM)

A single case study recently documented one woman’s ability to recall accurately vast amounts of autobiographical information, spanning most of her lifetime, without the use of practiced mnemonics (Parker, Cahill, & McGaugh, 2006). The current study reports findings based on eleven participants expressing this same memory ability, now referred to as Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM). Participants were identified and subsequently characterized based on screening for memory of public events. They were then tested for personal autobiographical memories as well as for memory assessed by laboratory memory tests. Additionally, whole-brain structural MRI scans were obtained. Results indicated that HSAM participants performed significantly better at recalling public as well as personal autobiographical events as well as the days and dates on which these events occurred. However, their performance was comparable to age- and sex-matched controls on most standard laboratory memory tests. Neuroanatomical results identified nine structures as being morphologically different from those of control participants. The study of HSAM may provide new insights into the neurobiology of autobiographical memory.

Highlights

► Eleven Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM) participants were identified. ► HSAM participants were significantly better at recalling public/autobiographical events. ► HSAM participants’ performance on standard laboratory memory tests was comparable to controls. ► Whole-brain analyses identified 9 structures as being morphologically different from controls.


Gunther Zupanc

Research in Prof. Zupanc’s laboratory focuses on the exploration of neural mechanisms underlying structural plasticity in the adult central nervous system of vertebrates. In particular, he is interested in the generation of new neurons in the adult brain and spinal cord (‘adult neurogenesis’) and in the replacement of neurons damaged through injury by newly generated ones (‘neuronal regeneration’).

His investigations are carried out in teleost fish, as these vertebrates – very much in contrast to mammals – exhibit an enormous potential to generate new neurons in both the intact and the injured central nervous system during adulthood. By combining cellular, neuroanatomical, neurophysiological, and behavioral approaches, he and his group attempt to identify key mechanisms underlying this production of new neurons, and to learn more about the behavioral consequences of the resulting structural dynamics of neural networks.

The ultimate goal of Prof. Zupanc’s research is to understand the evolutionary factors that have led to the enormous reduction of the neurogenic potential in mammals, while maintaining the generation of new neurons at high levels in the central nervous system of many non-mammalian taxa. Such a comparative approach will not only be essential to gain a biological understanding of adult neurogenesis, but also bears an enormous potential to open new vistas for the development of novel therapeutic strategies to replace neurons lost to injury or degenerative disease by newly generated ones.


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References: Unit I

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Comments:

  1. Ryland

    An interesting point

  2. Digor

    I join. I agree with told all above. We can communicate on this theme. Here or in PM.

  3. Sherwyn

    I would not say using this approach and logic, you can come to such delirium. So, it's not worth it, it's not worth it ... But, in general, thanks, it's really interesting and there is something to think about. All happy holidays and more bright ideas in NG !!!!! Let's light up the 31st!

  4. Sakasa

    I think, that you are mistaken. Write to me in PM, we will communicate.



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